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Abstract|In this paper, security requirements for an elec-
tronic transaction are examined. An overview of how SSL
and TLS work and their major dierences are subsequently
provided. The aim of the paper is to investigate how ef-
fective these protocols are in securing electronic payments.
This is achieved by considering how well they satisfy the
identied security requirements. The main nding is that,
although SSL and TLS are used widely as a means to secure
transactions, they do not provide suÆcient security. Since
they were designed to protect information while it is be-
ing transmitted, the e-commerce transaction data is stored
in clear on both the client and merchant machines. This
can be a threat in some circumstances. Non-repudiation
and authentication are also not satisfactorily addressed. To
be more precise, only Web server authentication is pro-
vided over SSL/TLS links. Therefore it is possible for both
client and merchant to deny making a transaction. Although
SSL/TLS provides protections against third party replay at-
tacks, replaying transaction details by merchants and clients
remains possible.
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I. Introduction
Electronic commerce is growing in signicance. Many
products, tangible and intangible, are sold over the Inter-
net, with payments typically made by debit or credit cards.
Therefore, there is an increase in concerns associated with
the security of the payment systems used to process online
transactions. Probably the main concern of most Internet
users relates to the condentiality of payment card infor-
mation. However, security for online transactions is not
limited to data condentiality, but also includes other se-
curity services such as authentication, identication, non-
repudiation and data integrity.
In a typical debit/credit card payment system, there are
four parties involved namely a client, a merchant, an ac-
quiring bank and a card issuing bank. A client, i.e. the
cardholder, makes a payment using a card issued by the
card issuing bank (issuer) for something purchased from
a merchant. The acquiring bank (acquirer) is the nan-
cial institution with which a merchant has a contractual
arrangement for receiving (acquiring) card payments. The
underlying payment model is shown in gure 1.
While the security of the nancial network can be as-
sumed, it is certainly not safe to assume the security of the
Internet. At the time of writing, SSL and TLS are the most
common means of providing security for the connection be-
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Fig. 1. Debit/credit card payment system.
tween merchants and clients. Consequently, it is the aim
of this paper to investigate how eectively SSL and TLS
serve this purpose, also bearing in mind security require-
ments for information handling at the client and merchant
sites. It is important to note that the analysis in this paper
is based on a business to customer (B2C) transaction using
a debit/credit card.
The paper begins by examining the security requirements
for an electronic transaction. An overview of how SSL and
TLS work and their major dierences are then provided.
We subsequently examine the eectiveness of the protocols
by considering how well they satisfy the security require-
ments. The nal section summarises and concludes the
paper.
II. Security Requirements
As shown in gure 1, a typical card payment system
involves four parties namely a card issuer, an acquirer, a
merchant and a client. The security requirements for each
party vary and hence they will be examined individually.
However, the requirements for acquirers and issuers are
combined since they are both nancial institutions, they
are both contractually obliged to abide by the rules of the
relevant payment system, and it can reasonably be assumed
that they have a similar risk model.
A. Issuers and Acquirers
1. Non-repudiation: Issuers and acquirers need to en-
sure that neither clients nor merchants can deny their
participation in a transaction (where the transaction may
involve a refund from merchant to client). In order to
achieve non-repudiation, identity authentication may also
be needed. Client authentication is required to prove that
it is the client who authorised the payment and he/she is a
legitimate cardholder. Otherwise, a client can deny making
a transaction and the issuer may end up being liable for re-
funding the amount to the client. On the other hand, if an
electronic transaction is found to be fraudulent, merchants
are liable for `card not present' chargebacks. Therefore,
it is important for the acquirer to ensure merchant non-
repudiation to prevent them challenging their liability.
2. Integrity: It is also important to ensure that once de-
tails of a transaction have been conrmed, no one can ma-
liciously modify them. Merchants must not be able to alter
the amount that a client has agreed to pay. To be more
specic, it should not be possible for a merchant to change
the amount after it has been authorised by the card issuer.
Similarly, a client must not be able to change the amount
that has been authorised.
3. Replay protection: A malicious merchant should not
be able to use a once authorised transaction to obtain a
repeat payment. Additionally, merchants should not be
able to use an old transaction to request a new payment
authorisation no matter how many similar transactions the
client has made with them. Issuers and acquirers need a
mechanism to detect if a transaction has been replayed so
that they do not authorise an illegitimate transaction.
B. Merchants
1. Non-repudiation: A merchant needs evidence that a
client has agreed to pay the amount associated with a trans-
action. A merchant also needs to verify that the client
is the legitimate cardholder; otherwise, the merchant can
be liable for chargebacks. This occurs when a client tells
his/her issuer that a particular transaction was not made.
The card issuer then immediately submits a chargeback to
the acquirer to recover the amount from the account of the
merchant in question. Within a predened period of time,
the merchant can dispute the chargeback by providing ev-
idence of, for example, purchase or delivery. Therefore,
it is important for merchants to have non-repudiable evi-
dence of the transaction, i.e. to have client non-repudiation.
Furthermore, an issuer should not be able to deny having
authorised a payment.
2. Authentication: As stated before, merchants need
client authentication to make sure that the client is the
legitimate cardholder. Moreover, they need to be sure that
they are communicating with the genuine acquirer. Oth-
erwise, an adversary may masquerade as an acquirer and
authorise an illegitimate transaction.
3. Integrity: No one should be able to change the details
of a transaction once they have been agreed upon. A mer-
chant will not wish to be credited with payment for less
than the amount agreed. In addition, an acquirer or issuer
should not be able to modify a transaction that has been
authorised.
4. Replay protection: A malicious client should not be
able to present an old proof of purchase to claim for repeat
delivery of goods. Likewise, it should not be possible for an
acquirer to claim that a merchant has obtained a payment
using an old transaction.
C. Clients
1. Condentiality and privacy: Transaction conden-
tiality, especially card information condentiality, may be
the security service of most concern to users. It is impor-
tant that cardholder account details are kept secret since
they are the main basis on which Internet payments are
made. Moreover, some users may require condentiality
protection for the nature of their transactions.
2. Integrity: As for the other parties, transaction in-
tegrity is important to the client. No one should be able to
maliciously modify the transaction details once they have
been conrmed. Clients will not want an adversary to
change a delivery address, the price or the description of
the merchandise after they have agreed a payment.
3. Authentication: A client needs to be sure that he/she
is dealing with a trustworthy merchant. When shopping on
the Internet, it is relatively easy to be lured into visiting a
site which appears to sell something but is actually simply
collecting card details. Even though a client may have
made a purchase from a site before, it is not always obvious
whether the page that is being fetched is authentic.
4. Replay protection: Clients need a mechanism to en-
sure that a malicious merchant or an adversary will not
be able to reuse previously authorised payments to make a
repeat charge.
III. An overview of SSL and TLS
In order to examine the eectiveness of SSL and TLS in
securing electronic transactions, it is important to under-
stand how they work. Therefore, in this section we briey
describe how SSL and TLS operate. More detailed speci-
cations can be found in [1] and [2].
A. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol was launched
in 1994 by Netscape, with the primary goal of provid-
ing secure communications between web browsers and web
servers. Security services provided include server authen-
tication, data encryption, (optional) client authentication
and data integrity. The following description of SSL oper-
ation is based on SSL 3.0, the current version at the time
of writing.
SSL is divided into two layers, namely the SSL hand-
shake protocol and the record layer. The handshake proto-
col, which is the upper layer, is responsible for initialising
and synchronising cryptographic state between the commu-
nicating parties. The record layer provides condentiality
and authentication, including protection against replay at-
tacks.
In the most typical case, there are ve main steps re-
quired to establish an SSL connection.
1. The client's browser rst sends a ClientHello message to
the web server. This message consists of a list of the cipher
suites the browser supports, the version of SSL it uses, the
data compression methods it can employ, and a challenge
string (a random number and a session ID).
2. The server sends back a ServerHello message consist-
ing of the SSL version number, a challenge string, and the
selected cipher suite and compression method. Then the
server sends a ServerKeyExchange message containing the
server's public key information. The server can optionally
request the client's certicate for user authentication by
sending a CerticateRequest message. Finally the server
sends a ServerHelloDone message to indicate that it has
nished with its initial negotiation messages.
3. The client sends its certicate (if requested by the
server) in a Certicate message. This is followed by a
ClientKeyExchange message which contains key informa-
tion, i.e. the `premaster secret' that will be used as a seed
to generate the master secret and keys subsequently used
for encryption. The key information is encrypted with the
server's public key. If client identication is required, a
CerticateVerify message must be sent to prove that the
client has the private key corresponding to the public key
in the certicate. The CerticateVerify message essentially
contains a signed hash of the key information and all pre-
vious SSL handshake messages exchanged so far.
4. The client sends a ChangeCipherSpec message to indi-
cate the starting point of a protected channel followed by
a ClientFinish message which contains a hash of the hand-
shake messages exchanged by the systems and the key in-
formation. The ClientFinish message is encrypted and au-
thenticated using the algorithms in the negotiated cipher
suite. Note that ChangeCipherSpec messages are not con-
sidered as handshake messages and thus are not included
in the hash.
5. The server sends back a ChangeCipherSpec message and
a ServerFinish message which are similar to the messages
with corresponding names sent by the client.
The next section briey explains how TLS operates and
the dierences between SSL and TLS.
B. Transport Layer Security (TLS)
In 1995, the IETF introduced a similar protocol called
Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.0 [2]. Opera-
tionally, SSL and TLS work in a very similar way. However,
there are some signicant dierences, as follows.
 The protocol version appearing in SSL messages is 3.0
while for TLS it is 3.1.
 TLS oers 11 more alert message types than SSL.
 For message authentication, SSL combines key infor-
mation and application data in an SSL-unique fashion.
By contrast, TLS employs a widely used and standard-
ised method for computing a Message Authentication Code
(MAC), i.e. the HMAC technique [3], to provide message
authentication.
 TLS employs a simpler CerticateVerify message. The
signed information includes only the handshake messages
exchanged so far. However, in SSL, the information con-
sists of two-round hash of the handshake messages, the
master secret and the padding.
 TLS employs a pseudorandom function (prf) to gener-
ate key materials using a master secret, a label in which
the name of the key is specied, and a seed as initial in-
puts. SSL, by contrast, uses a complex and rather ad hoc
procedure to generate key materials.
 The Finish message of SSL is created in an ad hoc way
whereas it is generated by a pseudorandom function in
TLS.
 The cipher suites oer in SSL includes Fortezza, while in
TLS it does not.
The dierences are summarised in Table 1 [4].
TABLE I
Differences between SSL and TLS
Attributes SSL v3.0 TLS v1.0
Protocol version in messages 3.0 3.1
Alert message types 12 23
Message authentication ad hoc standard
Key material generation ad hoc prf
CerticateVerify message complex simple
Finished message ad hoc prf
Baseline cipher suites Fortezza no Fortezza
Although these dierences between the two protocols do
exist, in the remainder of the paper both protocols will be
referred to as TLS unless explicitly stated otherwise.
IV. Analysis
This section analyses the eectiveness of TLS as a
method for securing electronic payments. This is achieved
by examining how well it satises the security requirements
described in Section II. Since TLS was designed to pro-
tect communications between Web clients and Web servers,
the analysis will only address interactions between clients
and merchants. Clearly, TLS cannot, by itself, address
any security issues relating to interactions between other
pairs of parties. In any event, interactions between issuers
and cardholders (mainly relating to card issue and billing)
are outside the scope of this paper. Similarly, we can as-
sume that interactions between issuers and acquirers are
addressed in the context of securing the nancial network,
and hence are again outside the scope of this paper.
As far as the acquirer/merchant interactions are con-
cerned, security services can be provided by separate secu-
rity mechanisms operating to protect communications be-
tween the merchant server and the acquirer host. Such
mechanisms would typically be managed by the acquirer.
Note, however, that unlike TLS, the use of SET
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does oer
a level of protection for merchant/acquirer interactions.
A. Condentiality
TLS protects transaction condentiality by using sym-
metric encryption. The encryption algorithm to be used in
any particular connection depends on the cipher suite nego-
tiated in the handshake protocol. Although TLS protects
the condentiality of transferred data against interception
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attacks, there remain some risks which need to be exam-
ined.
Since TLS was designed to provide condentiality be-
tween Web clients and Web servers, transaction informa-
tion is protected only while it is being transmitted. There-
fore, information such as clients' account details and ad-
dresses are exposed to the merchant. The users thus have
to rely on the security of the merchant's Web server. If
someone succeeds in penetrating the merchant server, po-
tentially large numbers of user account details could be
compromised.
Another issue is that the US federal regulations have
severely restricted the export of strong encryption tech-
nology. Until recently, this meant that popularly available
TLS implementations only used relatively short key lengths
unless both the communicating parties were within the US
or Canada [5].
In October 2000 the US export restrictions were relaxed
to allow TLS to use longer key lengths when the parties are
in the EU or one of eight other countries [5]. However, risks
clearly remain for clients and merchants in countries out-
side the scope of this new exemption. Moreover, this new
exemption still only permits 56-bit secret keys, for which
exhaustive key searches can be performed [6]. However it
is probably hard to imagine a circumstance where it would
be worth the eort of breaking such a key given that it will
only reveal the details of a single transaction.
TLS also protects the condentiality of information re-
garding the nature and value of the transaction whilst this
information is transmitted across the Internet. Of course,
TLS cannot oer any protection for the condentiality of
this data whilst it is stored at the merchant | although
such protection is probably meaningless since the merchant
will clearly need to know this information. However, unlike
in SET, when using TLS for security the merchant will also
know the account details of the purchaser, and hence can
use these to link transactions and build proles of user pur-
chasing behaviour. If required, consumer anonymity could
possible be achieved by using alternative payment mecha-
nisms | see, for example, [7]. However, if the merchant will
need the shipping address to deliver the purchased goods,
then achieving purchaser anonymity will be rather diÆcult!
B. Integrity
As for condentiality, TLS provides integrity protection
for transferred data only. Consequently, if an adversary
succeeds in compromising either the merchant server or
the client PC, it would be possible for them to modify the
information stored. As a result, such information will not
be helpful if there is a dispute. Moreover, for the same
reasons, TLS oers no protection against modication of
transaction information by corrupt merchants or clients.
C. Authentication
We next consider how TLS ensures the required authenti-
cation services | we subdivide this discussion into consid-
erations of merchant authentication, client authentication
and acquirer authentication.
C.1 Merchant authentication
The TLS protocol uses the server certicate as the basis
of server authentication. The client veries the server by
verifying its ability to decrypt information encrypted using
the server's public key. Nevertheless, there remain some
risks of server masquerade. One possibility is by means
of a `man in the middle attack'. Such an attack can be
launched relatively easily by using a sniÆng application
such as dsni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to intercept the communications between
two entities at the stage of TLS initialisation. An alterna-
tive means of launching this attack would be to use `Web
spoong' instead of a sniÆng application. However, in this
latter case, the user must be lured into visiting the at-
tacker's page rst [8].
Briey, the man in the middle attack operates as fol-
lows. After successfully inserted themselves in the middle
of the communication, the attacker simply fetches the page
requested by the client from the genuine server. Upon re-
ceipt of the requested page, the malicious server returns
the spoofed page to the client. The spoofed page is the
page containing rewritten URLs of the links on the page.
This enables the attacker to maintain a compromised link
between the client and whichever server is visited, since if
the client clicks any links on the page, the request will go
through the attacker and the process repeats [9], [8].
If a TLS connection is in use, the attacker simply es-
tablishes two secure connections, one with the client and
the other with the server. Thereby, he/she can read and
modify the information sent between the two parties as
well as convince them that they are communicating via a
secure channel. However, since TLS requires server au-
thentication, the attack should be prevented by the client
examining the certicate or the URL of the page, since
the certicate will show the URL of the attacker instead
of the genuine server. However, the attacker can control
the appearance of the URL to the client by using scripting
techniques | moreover, users will often neglect to check
such details, since Web browsers tend to be designed to
make things as easy as possible and minimise the work for
the user. Hence, although the server authentication in TLS
prevents such attacks in theory, the practical situation is
rather dierent.
C.2 Client authentication
While server authentication is mandatory, user authen-
tication is an optional part of TLS. If client authentication
is to be provided, a public key pair and certicate for the
client are required. However, most clients do not have key
pairs and public key certicates. Even if they do, in most
cases the key pair is stored in their PC. This gives rise to a
further threat, since anyone who has access to the user's PC
may gain the ability to make transactions on behalf of the
user. This is especially the case where the merchant uses
the client identity to access records containing user per-
sonal information including mailing address and account
details.
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C.3 Acquirer authentication
Since TLS only oers protection for Web server/Web
client communications, unlike SET it clearly cannot ad-
dress any security requirements relating to interactions be-
tween merchants and acquirers. Such security requirements
will therefore need to be addressed in other ways.
D. Non-repudiation
Although TLS uses signatures for session establishment,
all protection of communicated data is achieved using sym-
metric cryptographic techniques. Hence TLS provides no
non-repudiation services; that is, neither client nor mer-
chant has any cryptographic evidence that a transaction
has taken place.
E. Replay Protection
TLS provides protection against third party replay at-
tacks by including random numbers in the handshake pro-
tocol. However, since TLS simply provides a secure means
of communication between clients and servers, and pro-
vides no long-term `evidence' regarding transactions (as
discussed in Section IV-D), TLS does not provide any pro-
tection against manipulation (including replay) or repudi-
ation of transaction information by merchants or clients.
V. Conclusion
Although each party involved in an electronic transaction
has a dierent risk model, they share some fundamental
security requirements. These are condentiality, authenti-
cation, non-repudiation, integrity and replay protection.
Due to the purpose of the protocol, TLS provides con-
dentiality and integrity only while the information is being
transmitted. Once the information has reached its destina-
tion, TLS oers no protection, and any security measures
depend on the choices of the communicating parties. As a
result, there are risks of information being compromised if
either side of the communication has been penetrated.
TLS only mandates server authentication. Therefore, if
TLS is used to protect electronic transactions, it is possible
for anyone who has access to the client's PC to impersonate
the client. Moreover, TLS does not provide either clients
or merchants with protections against repudiation. This
makes transaction information stored by either party of
little value in the event of a dispute.
TLS provides only partial protection against replay at-
tacks. It prevents a third party using an intercepted TLS
messages. However, it does not prevent corrupt merchants
or clients re-using a transaction.
From the analysis, two issues are worth noting. Firstly,
since SSL and TLS were not designed specically to secure
payments over the Internet, not surprisingly they do not
satisfy all the security requirements for electronic transac-
tions. It is important that e-commerce clients and mer-
chants do not have a false sense of security when using
them. Secondly, it would be interesting to see how elec-
tronic transaction security could be enhanced by combin-
ing use of SSL/TLS with certain additional simple security
features, as an alternative to accepting the signicant cost
of adopting a more complex solution such as SET. This
latter issue is the subject of ongoing research.
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